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‘‘. . .our minds shine not through the body, but are wrapt up here in a dark covering of uncrystalized ﬂesh and blood; so
that, if we would come to the speciﬁc characters of them, we must go some other way to work.’’ Tristram Shandy, Vol. 1.
Chapter 23.
Although DES is an ingenious and valuable technique, we have doubts that it can achieve quite what it claims to achieve.
Our reservations stem from distorting effects produced by the observational stance DES asks subjects to adopt when trying
to isolate their ‘‘pristine’’ experiences—as well as the passive model of mentality such a technique presupposes. Our worry is
that these two features of DES, rather than serving to isolate or disclose the target explanandum in a high ﬁdelity manner,
instead potentially construct it—thus handing over an experience for investigation that may be high in ﬁdelity but low in
descriptive accuracy (i.e., insofar as it is a faithful characterization of the original experience as lived through). While difﬁ-
culties with introspective analysis are noted (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Kelsey, 2013, p. 1479), it is nevertheless assumed that
introspection and memory (i.e., of the experience just as it has passed) are sufﬁcient to grant access to high ﬁdelity reports
of minimally altered experiences.
But why should we assume that an introspective stance is a descriptively neutral way of gaining access to mental con-
tents? After all, we do not normally witness our experiences from a distance the way we observe a play from a seat in
the theater; rather, we actively inhabit them—we live through them, onto the world and the situations we ﬁnd ourselves
in. In other words, experiences are not discrete inner entities we relate to; they are, rather, relational. Experiences are ongo-
ing processes of orienting ourselves to the world, and the people and things in it. When we see the expressionless face of a
stranger as we board the subway, savor the richness of whisky as it rolls around on our tongue, hear a familiar voice call out
to us in a crowded shopping center, or feel the sudden jolt of a pothole as we drive along a road in need of repair, we are not
ﬁrst conscious of an inner sense datum representing features of an external world. We are conscious of the world itself.
Our worry, then, is not merely the concern (widely noted) that introspection is often an unreliable guide to experience (cf.
Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007; Vermersch, 1999). Even less is our concern that the verbal reports of introspected experience
can never fully do the experience justice. Our concern, rather, is that introspection constructs the ‘‘pristine’’ mental phenom-
ena it purports to discover. Thus, when subjects are made to adopt an artiﬁcially passive and observational stance on their
experiences, and then issue reports (guided by the interviewer), they transform what are initially world-directed vehicles
dynamically lived through into objectiﬁed contents abstracted from the concrete relations and context that are part of their
essential nature. This transformation is more than a ‘‘minimal alteration’’.
Our concern can be further highlighted by looking at how DES appears to downplay or overlook the relation between
experience and agency. DES presupposes a kind of experiential atomism: the existence of neatly-circumscribed, ready-maden, 22 (4)
.
10 J. Krueger et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 25 (2014) 9–10experiences lying in wait to be discovered and reported in high ﬁdelity. But this atomistic way of thinking about experience
misses the central role that agency plays in constituting and sustaining experience. This is because mentality is an activity;
the sort of minds we have are shaped by the sorts of things we do. We experience the world through ongoing patterns of
exploratory activities; perception and action are coupled. Beliefs, desires, and intentions do not suddenly arise within us
as pre-formed mental constructs. We actively sustain them, giving them content, shape and character by committing to
them, acting on them, and altering or revising them in the face of further evidence and experience. Even emotions and affect
reﬂect the input of our agency. We enact the evaluative trajectory of an anger, for example, by raising our voice, clenching
our ﬁsts and (literally and ﬁguratively) digging in our heels; alternatively, we actively suppress it by taking a deep breath and
redirecting our attention to more pleasant thoughts. This is not to deny the existence of some passive mental happenings
(e.g., aches, pains, twinges, itches, tickles, urges, disgust, sudden ﬂashes of insight or inspiration, etc.). Even in these cases,
however, the character of these experiences is profoundly altered by what we dowith them. And the point, ultimately, is that
these cases of passive experience are the exception, and not the rule.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that there is no value in introspective analysis generally, and in DES in particular. As
conscious subjects, we do have inner lives—and introspective reports (particularly by attentive, well-trained subjects) can
often tell us interesting things about what goes over the course of these inner lives. In particular, the application of DES
to inner speaking sheds new and interesting light on the nature, frequency, and individual differences in the frequency,
of inner speaking. However, for the reasons we have discussed, we should remain mindful that introspective methods
can only ever give us a limited perspective on the experience of the situated, active mind.
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